to supranational regulation touching upon traditional social security issues such as income maintenance and solidarity. Despite profound obstacles to the retrenchment of public pay-asyou-go (PAYG) pensions, almost all member states carried through significant cuts. 1 In the Netherlands, for instance, retrenchment measures resulted in a decrease of the basic public pension as a percentage of the average gross salary of 25 per cent between 1980 and 1998 (Delsen 2000, 151) . And for Germany, Alber shows that the standard pension in 1998 is 22
per cent less than it would be if the pre-1977 legislation were still in effect (Alber 1998, 24) .
The 2001 pension reform reduced the standard pension further from 70 to 64 per cent (Haverland 2001) . The decrease in the public PAYG pensions relative to wage earnings has been an important stimulus for occupational pensions based on funding, which generally increased in importance for the income security of the elderly. This holds in particular for those countries that have flat rate public pensions, providing higher income earners with an importance of private pensions is also indicated in the rise of pension funds assets over the last decade (see Table 1 ).
As occupational pensions are directly linked with the labor market and most schemes are capital funded rather than PAYG, the border between EU regulated labor and financial market issues and national welfare issues become blurred. There is a large variation in member state regulations concerning the way occupational pensions are set up, the security of accrued occupational pension rights and benefits, and the degree of inbuilt solidarity (see Table 1 ). This diversity has a number of negative effects on European integration. Companies employing workers in different member states have a high administrative burden as they have to subscribe to and administer as many pension schemes as countries they are operating in.
Next, the free movement of workers is hampered, as in many cases these workers cannot transfer accrued entitlements to another country, or, as they lose tax subsidies to which they would be entitled to in the country of origin. The regulatory diversity is also an obstacle for the integration of capital markets due to quantitative restrictions on investments in some countries, most notably restrictions on foreign assets.
Towards a liberal European regime?
Given the market distorting effects of the national diversity in occupational pension regimes, the international political economy literature hypothesizes that internationally-oriented pension funds will strive for the freedom to invest and to provide services throughout the European Union. These funds are extremely powerful as they jointly control large capital assets, in some countries (almost) equaling the national GDP (see Table 1 ). The pension funds will be supported by multi-national companies who suffer from national diversity in regulations. Sponsoring a single pension fund for all employees in the EU countries reduces transaction costs and stimulates intra-firm labor mobility. Moreover, the removal of quantitative investment restrictions makes pension products cheaper. The lobbying group of the pension fund industry estimates that companies would save 3 billion EUR a year if it pooled their various schemes into one fund that is regulated according to a liberal approach (EFRP 2000, 21) . In a period of economic and financial internationalization its voice in decision making is significantly strengthened by credibly threatening to exit, i.e. to locate production and service facilities elsewhere (Hirschman 1970; Milner and Keohane 1996, 19-20; Scharpf 1996) . The position of international business is further strengthened by its capacity to lobby at all levels of the European multi-level polity (Smith 2001, 520) and by its close relationship to the European Commission which sees international business as its natural ally in its liberalization agenda (Van Apeldoorn 2000) .
Structure of the paper
The theoretical discussion implies two rival hypotheses about the general shape of European occupational policies; from an international political economy perspective it can be hypothesized that European policies have strong liberal traits, whereas the welfare state literature posits that given its importance for national legitimacy and path-dependent heterogeneity European policies will be rather limited and symbolic granting national discretion. In order to arrive at more precise hypotheses about how these general expectations play out more specifically in occupational pension policies, the next section will sketch the issues at stake in this policy area and will also provide an overview of the national status quo ante. This treatment seems to be rather technical but it is important to note that these 'technicalities' may have important material consequences for contributors and beneficiaries, (multi-national) companies, pension funds and member states (Section 2). Then, the more refined hypotheses about the content of the European policy will be deduced (Section 3).
Section 4 presents the case study on EU occupational pension policies. Using pattern matching of outcomes for rival explanations, the study evaluates to what extent the hypothesized patterns match the empirical observations (George and Bennett 2005, Yin 1994 ). The case study is largely based on interviews with key actors in the policy process, the analysis of legal texts, and information gathered from specialized professional journals and newsletters, such as Investment & Pensions Europe (I&PE). Section 5 reports the main results of the case study and discusses its implications for the two theoretical perspectives.
The diversity of national occupational pension regimes
There are a number of issues that can be potentially addressed by occupational pension regulations and the large diversity of national regulatory schemes reflect that these issues have been decided in a variety of ways on the domestic level (see Table 1 Besides the set up of occupational pension schemes and the degree of inbuilt solidarity, pension regulation also concerns the security of investment. Here different regulatory styles can be discerned that cut across the three worlds of pension welfare (Davis 2001; OECD 1998; Queisser 1998 Sweden, impose more quantitative restrictions on the investment of pension funds: which financial instruments are authorized for investments, for instance shares, bonds, loans, is legally specified ex ante; minimum or maximum quotas are stipulated for the share of certain instruments in the overall portfolio; foreign assets are restricted; and matching between the currency of the liabilities and the currencies of assets is to a certain degree required (Davis 2001 ). Yet recent reforms in the 'Continental' pension states Italy (in 1993), and Germany (in 2001) are also based on the prudent person rule.
In addition to this general approach to investment regulation, there is typically also regulation in place that seeks to ensure that pension funds have enough assets to finance their commitments, the so-called technical provisions. Regulation can stipulate for instance that liabilities are fully funded: either on average over a certain time period, or at all times.
(OECD 1998; Queisser 1998). Again there is large diversity between member states in regard to the stringency of these solvency standards cutting across the typology of pension states.
This regulatory diversity combined with the increasing importance of occupational pensions for income maintenance after retirement and for achieving social policies goals such as solidarity across gender, and within and across generation, implies that EU policies area that seek to cope with adverse effects on the European labor, capital and service market potentially interfere with national social policies: national welfare states meet the EU regulatory state.
For instance, the possibility of transborder membership in pension schemes would undermine the solidaristic compulsory arrangements in most Scandinavian countries and in the Netherlands due to adverse selection. As the compulsory schemes have average premiums and have to accept all potential members, a sponsoring firm with a relative good 'risk' structure, for instance young and healthy employees, has an incentive to exit the collective system and to sponsor a scheme abroad, which in turn would undermine the solidarity of the domestic scheme.
Another example is the potential danger of forum shopping with the effect of a race to the bottom with regard to regulations and enforcement. Companies have an incentive to sponsor schemes in countries where the legislation is less stringent or less strongly supervised and enforced as pension funds in those countries can provide cheaper products. Member states would have to allow their citizens to sponsor schemes abroad, hence beyond their control, but the citizens would fall back on domestic social security and assistance in cases of pension fund insolvency or unexpected drawbacks.
In short: the ability of member states to achieve social policy goals with funded occupational pensions -in many countries supported with generous tax subsidies -may be undermined by a relatively unrestricted single market for pensions.
Hypotheses
Based on the overview of potential issues that could be regulated on the EU level, it is now possible to derive more precise observable implications of the two rival theories. According to the welfare state literature, European integration is unlikely in the pension area, as member states are jealously guarding their competencies in this electorally sensitive area (van Kersbergen and Verbeek 1997). Moreover, differences in welfare levels and the institutional heterogeneity of path-dependent national welfare regimes, for instance concerning the relative importance of the occupational pension pillar, make European harmonization difficult, even if governments would prefer to do so (see Introduction). In this view, member states are generally opposed to any directive in this area, and as by implication governments being the most powerful actors in the European Union, there will be no European directive or a rather a symbolic one. The directive will be narrow in scope, and full of exemptions safeguarding national autonomy. The existing diversity in worlds of pension welfare will remain unaffected by the directive. Note that this outcome pattern should not depend on the specific decision-making procedure in the Council (unanimity/qualified majority voting),
given the expected homogeneity of member state preferences.
From the perspective of those theories in international political economy that emphasize the power of international business -partly transmitted via the European Commission (Milner and Keohane 1996, Van Apeldoorn 2000) , it can be hypothesized, that
those European policies will be adopted that have strong liberal traits favoring choice rather than benefit security and solidarity: granting pension funds a maximum freedom to invest, and lacking strict solvency requirements and protection against biometric risks. These policies will require that national tax, labor-and social legislation that distort the European market will have to be abolished. The European Commission clearly aims at liberalizing the pension market. Taking prudence in investments as basic concept, the Commission very much followed the ideas furthered by the international financial service industry that heavily lobbied the Commission already at the pre-proposal stage (EFRP 2002 , Tamminga 2000 . To make it more palatable for the member states, member states were allowed to adopt some quantitative restrictions.
Also, the Commission does not go so far as questioning domestic social and labor laws. In the case of transborder activities, pension funds have to respect the relevant laws of the host country. This provision is likely to establish significant obstacles for transborder activities. In order not to overburden the agenda, the European Commission has left the problem of tax discrimination and other issues regarding the free movement of workers outside the scope of the directive. Tax discrimination is arguably the greatest obstacle to a single market for pensions. Harmonizing tax treatment has been dropped, as the European Commission anticipated large member state opposition, which would be difficult to break in particular as the tax issue would require unanimity in the Council (I&PE 9 March 2001). In this sense the proposal is quite narrow, but overall it matches most closely the perspective pointing to a European liberal regime.
4.2
Amplifying liberalization strongly while strengthening the social dimension: the prointegration position of the EP The European Parliament is known for its strive for pro-integrationist outcomes in EU decision-making processes (Hix 1999, 79) . The case study reveals that occupational pensions are no exception to this: a broad majority of the EP preferred more far reaching integration in occupational policies than the European Commission aimed for in its proposal. However, the European parliament was deeply divided about the issue whether the more integrationist solution should have a liberal or a social outlook.
The European People Party Group (EPP-DE, Christian-democrats and Conservatives)
and the liberal party group (ELDRP) supported the European Commissions approach to clearly frame the directive as a single market directive. These parties wanted to increase the liberal outlook of the directive in a number of ways. Most importantly, they proposed to phase out the possibility to erect quantitative investment restrictions. After a transitional period of a maximum of five years full investment freedom should be secured. Moreover, they proposed more lenient solvency requirements. In particular, they proposed for crossborder activities the application of home country rule rather than 'fully funding at all time'.
This implies that rather than imposing a uniform EU standard, they wish to leave this issue to the mechanisms of mutual recognition: member states with high solvency standards would have to accept the operation of pension funds originating from member states with low standards on their territory.
The Socialist Party Group (PES) was not a cohesive countervailing force against this plan for strong liberalization. On the contrary, it was deeply divided about the directive along . In Germany, the government had enacted a major pension reform in 2001, and during the implementation process of the reform it was decided that pension funds will be governed by prudent person principle (dpn July/Augustus 2002).
Hence, the debate followed very much the logic of 'regulatory competition': member states seek to upload their own regulatory practices in order to reduce adaptation costs, once the directive is in place (Heritier et al. 1996) . Note, however, that the conflict in the Council revolved around investment regulation and solvency standards. None of the member states wanted to turn the directive into a social policy directive or include incentives for social policy elements indirectly, by restricting its application to those pension funds covering biometric risks.
In order to achieve a common position it was crucial to achieve a compromise on financial regulation issues while it was clear that no social issues would be included. The Spanish government that took over the presidency from the Belgians proposed a number of 7 As the Dutch pension funds cover the longevity, disability risks and as a default also survivor benefits, one may expect these funds to argue for the Europeanization of their approach. However, these funds are managed by the social partners who want to keep their domestic autonomy to negotiate these issues as the domestic level and are therefore against the transfer of competencies to the EU (Interview). Most critically, the EP did not re-introduce a temporal limitation to quantitative restrictions and it endorsed that host member states, under certain conditions, can dictate that pension funds active in their territory have to obey to stricter standards than in their home country. With regard to biometric risks, the EP amendments are rather symbolic. It is said that pension benefits should be generally paid out in the form of life time payments but it can also be paid as lump sum or for a temporary period. Also, rather than obliging member states to demand from their pension funds to offer the option to cover biometric risks and the guarantee of repayment of contributions, the EP proposed that member states may demand so, if employers and employees agree. However, there is no need for such a provision, as member states are allowed to do so anyway, in other words, the provision does not add any substance to the directive.
Discussion and Conclusion
The European pension fund directive will neither lead to a full liberalization of pension markets, nor does it establish a European social policy regime at the EU level. Despite The case study also showed that the European Parliament was divided, with a majority favoring a liberal rather than a social approach to the issue. Interestingly, the socialist fraction group did not uniformly favor a directive with strong social elements. Its preferences were shaped by the national status quo rather than general party ideology. Given this fragmentation it was relatively easy for the Council to impose its will on the EP.
The directive is close to the least common denominator in the Council, although some smaller countries, like Austria and Finland need to change their status quo. But it should be kept in mind that yet again another area of public policy that traditionally had been solely regulated by the member states, has been made subject to European integration. Moreover, rather than the new voluntaristic and intergovernmental open method of coordination a directive has been chosen. Hence supra-national rules have established European minimum standards with regard to the operation and supervision of pension funds, technical provisions and investment freedoms which will also apply to new countries joining the European Union.
Member states are locked into this system. Any member state that wants to unilaterally change its policies has to do so within the boundaries set by the directive. As the history of European integration has shown, once a directive is in place ambiguities and vague language, in this case for example with regard to the meaning of the 'prudentially justified', may unleash monitoring and enforcement activities by the Commission and the Court that may increase the grip on the member states.
